Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the Famous by Adams, Ben C.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1980 Article 5 
10-1980 
Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the 
Famous 
Ben C. Adams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ben C. Adams, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the Famous, 33 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1251 (1980) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol33/iss5/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
INHERITABILITY OF THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY UPON THE DEATH OF THE
FAMOUS
I. INTRODUCTION
The exploitation of famous names and likenesses in the mar-
keting of consumer products involves huge sums of money.1 Courts
have recognized, albeit haphazardly, the tremendous pecuniary
value of celebrity endorsements and have afforded individuals the
right to exclusive control over their names and likenesses. 2 Al-
though courts have applied various labels to this guarantee, s the
term most commonly used is "right of publicity."'4 Given the large
amount of money at stake, clear delineation of the scope of this
right is imperative. Recently, however, state and federal courts5
have reached divergent results concerning the inheritability of the
right of publicity upon the death of the famous. More specifically,
the Second and Sixth circuits reached opposite conclusions6 on this
1. Licensing-the business of using famous names, titles, slogans, and so forth to sell
consumer products-has emerged as a full-blown industry that has estimated annual royal-
ties of twenty to thirty million dollars and that is responsible for the sale of hundreds of
millions of dollars of consumer products each year. Connor, The Licensing of Famous
Names to Sell Products is a Booming Field These Days, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1974, at 34, col.
1.
2. See notes 7-32 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969) ("property
right"); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 603 P.2d 425, 428, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 326 (1979) ("right of value").
4. This label was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See notes
15-18 infra and accompanying text.
5. The inheritability of the right of publicity is clearly a question of state law. Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1977). Federal courts, however, have
recently confronted this issue without any state precedents to guide them. Thus, federal
courts have been forced to define the parameters of a state common-law issue without any
judicial input from the states.
6. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that Presley's right of publicity is not inheritable despite previous exploitation during
1251
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question under virtually identical factual circumstances. After
tracing the evolution of the right of publicity, this Recent Develop-
ment focuses on these recent decisions confronting the issue of
descendibility. This Recent Development then concludes that the
right of publicity should be inheritable for a designated period of
time and that inheritability should not depend upon previous ex-
ploitation of the right.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Though the phrase "right of publicity" is of recent origin,7 the
law protecting a person from the appropriation of his name and
likeness evolved under the rubric of the right of privacy. Dean
Prosser maintained that the right of privacy embraces "four dis-
tinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff,
which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have
almost nothing in common except that each represents an inter-
ference with the right of the plaintiff 'to be let alone.' "8 One type
of invasion is the appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness
for the defendant's benefit.' Thus, because the gist of any invasion
of privacy claim is interference with the plaintiff's right to be left
alone, a privacy invasion of the appropriation type involves mental
injury0 such as damage to reputation or hurt feelings.
The right of publicity, however, protects a totally different in-
terest. Here, the focus is on economic injury to the plaintiff. The
celebrity is not concerned with freedom from emotional harm, but
rather is upset about the exploitation of his name without his con-
sent or financial remuneration."' Despite these differences in the
interests protected, for many years courts applied right of privacy
principles to cases of economic injury.1 2 Consequently, damages
were not allowed absent proof of mental injury, s and the right
his life); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that
the right of publicity, because exercised during Presley's life, survives his death and may be
validly transferred).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210 N.W. 482 (1926) (posing as plain-
tiff's wife); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907) (providing father for
child on birth certificate).
11. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
12. For a thorough discussion of this problem, see Gordon, Right of Property in
Name, Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. U.L. Rav. 553 (1960); Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoTssmp. PROBs. 203 (1954).
13. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales .Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942).
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protected was deemed personal 4 and hence neither assignable nor
inheritable.
Since the landmark case of Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,'6 however, many courts have distinguished the
economic interest from the personal. In Haelen plaintiff manufac-
turer held a baseball player's exclusive product endorsement con-
tract and sued a rival manufacturer for infringement thereof. In
finding an infringement of the contract, the court stated that, in
addition to, but independent of, the right of privacy, an individual
has a right to the "publicity value of his photograph"'" and the
power to transfer the "exclusive privilege of publishing his pic-
ture"' 7 without having to transfer anything else. The court found it
unnecessary to label this interest a property right, reasoning that
such a label merely reflects the fact that courts enforce claims that
have pecuniary worth. Instead, the Haelen court suggested that
this right be called a "right of publicity."' 8
Since Judge Frank's coining of the phrase in the Haelen opin-
ion, courts have increasingly recognized, by enforcing this right of
publicity, the economic interest of celebrities in controlling the use
of their names and likenesses.' 9 For example, in Uhlaender v. Hen-
dricksen,2 0 an action by numerous professional baseball players
and their players' association to enjoin defendant manufacturer
from using players' names in a baseball table game without enter-
ing into a royalty or license agreement, the district court held that
the players and association had a proprietary or property interest
in their names, sporting activities, and accomplishments sufficient
to enable them to enjoin commercial use thereof.2  Similarly, in
Cepeda v. Swift & Co.22 the Eighth Circuit also recognized a celeb-
rity's economic interest in his name and likeness. Although deny-
14. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 883 (1965).
15. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
16. Id. at 868.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-78
(1977); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1974);
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Uhlaender v. Hendricksen,
316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-83 (D. Minn. 1970); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th
Cir. 1969); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62, 75-76 (1967);
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1977).
20. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
21. Id. at 1283.
22. 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).
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ing recovery on the facts,23 the court found that the plaintiff, a
professional baseball player, had a valuable and marketable prop-
erty right in his name, photograph, and image.
The notion that a right of publicity exists independently of
any right of privacy became firmly entrenched by the Supreme
Court's recognition of this right in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.24 In Zacchini a television station had broadcast
plaintiff's fifteen second "human cannonball" act and, in response
to plaintiff's suit for invasion of his right of publicity, claimed the
first amendment privilege25 to report newsworthy events. The Ohio
Supreme Court26 was persuaded by this constitutional argument,
but the United States Supreme Court reversed.2 7 The Court, rely-
ing upon goals developed by patent and copyright laws, 28 reasoned
that a state has an interest in guaranteeing the right of publicity so
as to encourage creativity by protecting the proprietary interest of
an individual in his talents.2 9 The Court noted that a celebrity nor-
mally has no objection to widespread publicity about his talents
provided he obtains some of the commercial benefits therefrom.30
Furthermore, the Court, while quoting one of the commentaries31
with approval, emphasized that the purpose of guaranteeing the
right of publicity is to prevent unjust enrichment by the theft of
goodwill because no social purpose is served by allowing outside
parties to exploit free of charge a valuable celebrity image.32
23. The court concluded that plaintiff had contracted with defendant sporting goods
manufacturer and granted it the exclusive right to manufacture baseballs bearing plaintiff's
name and to license others to do so. Consequently, the court held that plaintiff could not
recover damages from the manufacturer or defendant meat processor to increase his sales by
tying in the sale of baseballs with the sale of its meat products. Id. at 1207-08.
24. 433 U.S. 562, 575-78 (1977).
25. If use of a person's name or likeness is privileged under the first amendment, then
there is no remedy afforded under the "right of publicity." As the Zacchini case illustrates,
however, the scope of the first amendment privilege is often difficult to determine. This
Recent Development does not address the problems posed by the first amendment privilege.
For a discussion of the relationship between the right of publicity and the first amendment,
see Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88
YALE L.J. 1577 (1979).
26. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976).
27. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
28. The Court stated that "the State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his
endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation." Id. at 573.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CoNraMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966).
32. 433 U.S. at 576.
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Although the existence of the right of publicity is clear the
precise parameters of this right are uncertain. Unlike the right of
privacy, which is personal,3 the right of publicity has generally
been held to be assignable.3 While many decisions have labelled
the right of publicity a species of property, 5 others have noted
that such a label follows only from the parameters given to the
right of publicity and therefore is immaterial to the determination
of the parameters themselves." Consequently, recent decisions ad-
dressing the inheritability of the right of publicity must be consid-
ered against the background of the early application of right of pri-
vacy principles and the recently emerged distinction between
economic interests under the right of publicity and personal inter-
ests protected by the right of privacy. Because the right of public-
ity is independent of the right of privacy, courts are not bound by
principles applicable to the latter but are free to determine the
parameters of the right of publicity by analogy to the laws of prop-
erty, privacy, copyright, and other areas.
III. RECENT TREATMENT OF INHERITABILITY
A. Decisions in Favor of Inheritability
Only in recent years have courts confronted the issue whether
the right of publicity is inheritable. The first decision to address
this question clearly was Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,;" which
involved a dispute over the right to use the names and likenesses
of Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy after their deaths. The exclu-
sive right to exploit the comedy team commercially had been as-
signed to plaintiff by Laurel during his lifetime, by Hardy's widow
33. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 814-15.
34. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978);
Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (8th Cir. 1969); Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
35. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp.
1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
36. See, e.g., Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 807. See also Note,
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 757-
58 (1978).
37. Though several of the recent decisions have discussed older case law in their anal-
ysis, all of the older cases relied on are clearly distinguishable. See, e.g., note 69 infra.
38. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The trial court in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
172 U.S.P.G. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), was the first court to actually address this
issue, but was subsequently reversed. See notes 63-75 infra and accompanying text.
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and sole heir under Hardy's will, and by Laurel and Hardy's pro-
duction company. When defendants sought to use the names and
likenesses of Laurel and Hardy, plaintiff-assignee sued. The dis-
trict court ruled that the actors' deaths did not extinguish the
right of publicity held by plaintiff-assignee. Distinguishing the
right of publicity from the right of privacy, the Price court rea-
soned that, while the right of privacy should not be assignable or
inheritable because its purpose is to prevent injury to feelings, the
right of publicity provides purely commercial protection. The court
noted that other courts had recognized this distinction by insuring
the assignability of the right of publicity. Discerning no reasons to
deny inheritability, the court, in a case of first impression, held
that the right is inheritable.3 9
Since the Price decision, several cases have addressed the is-
sue of inheritability as a result of the death of Elvis Presley. Prior
to Presley's death, Boxcar, Inc. held the exclusive right to market
his name and likeness. 40 Boxcar and the previous grantees of Pres-
ley's right of publicity had marketed the Presley persona for many
years with great success. 41 After Presley's death Boxcar sold these
exclusive rights to Factors Etc., Inc.42 Subsequently, Factors be-
came embroiled in suits over its right to the exclusive control of
Presley's name and likeness.
Several suits in the federal courts of New York3 culminated in
the Second Circuit's decision in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc.44 The Factors court held that Boxcar's exclusive right to ex-
ploit the Presley name and likeness, because-, exercised during
Presley's life, survived his death and was validly transferred to
Factors.45 The court distinguished between the right of publicity
and the right of privacy in regard to the interests protected and
the remedies afforded. The opinion focused on the policy ratio-
nales behind the right of publicity as enumerated by the Supreme
39. 400 F. Supp. at 844.
40. Presley, however, was a shareholder in Boxcar, Inc. Memphis Dev. Foundation v.
Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir. 1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215, 216-17 (2d Cir. 1978).
41. 616 F.2d at 957; 579 F.2d at 217.
42. 616 F.2d at 957; 579 F.2d at 217. Presley's father signed as executor of the estate
and as representative of Presley's share of Boxcar.
43. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Factors Etc., Inc. v. The Wild
Side, Inc., No. 77-4705 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1977).
44. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at 222.
1256 [Vol. 33:1251
1980] PUBLICITY INHERITABILITY 1257
Court in Zacchini and cited with approval the approach taken by
the Price court.46 The Factors court maintained that Presley
carved out a separate intangible property right for himself by as-
signing to Boxcar the exclusive authority to print, publish, and dis-
tribute his name and likeness. 47 The court reasoned that because
Presley was merely the beneficiary of an income interest in Box-
car's exclusive right, Presley's death should not in itself extinquish
Boxcar's property right. "Instead, the income interest ... should
inure to Presley's estate at death like any other intangible property
right.14 8 The court also stressed that denying inheritability would
allow third parties a windfall in the form of profits from the use of
Presley's name and likeness.'9
Thus, through the Price and Factors decisions,50 the federal
courts have established a descendible right of publicity in New
York 1 and guaranteed Factors the right to exclusive control over
Presley's name and likeness. Unfortunately for Factors, the courts
of other jurisdictions have not been so favorable.
B. Decisions Against Inheritability
In another Presley case involving Factor's attempt to assert
exclusive control over the Presley name and likeness in Tennessee,
the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors
Etc., Inc.52 held5" that the right of publicity is not inheritable even
46. Id. at 220-21.
47. Id. at 221.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. While the Price and Factors opinions appear harmonious, the question whether a
person must exploit his name or likeness during his lifetime in order for his right of public-
ity to survive him remains unanswered. The Price decision intimates that previous exploita-
tion is unnecessary, 400 F. Supp. at 846, while the Factors court specifically refrains from
addressing this question. 579 F.2d at 222 n.11.
51. The district court in Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), expressly followed the Factors holding on the inheritability issue, but held that the
first amendment privilege protected the infringement under the particular facts before it.
See also note 25 supra.
52. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
53. This decision reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Factors. The
Sixth Circuit, however, had previously affirmed in a decision without a published opinion,
578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978), the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction against
Memphis Development Foundation. The trial court in that case thoroughly examined the
case law on the descendibility issue and decided to enjoin any further exploitation by Mem-
phis Development Foundation because of its determination that Factors would probably win
on the descendibility issue. This decision is reported in 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn.
1977).
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when a person has exploited the right by contract during life. The
trial court had concluded, after analyzing recent case law, that the
right is inheritable. 4 The Sixth Circuit, however, without citing
supporting authorities, 5 weighed various policy arguments and
concluded that a celebrity's name should pass to the public domain
upon his death. The court reasoned that recognition of a post-
mortem right of publicity would vindicate two possible interests:
the encouragement of effort and creativity and a decedent's expec-
tations of creating a valuable asset for his heirs.58 According to the
Memphis Development court, however, the desire to exploit fame
for the financial advantage of one's heirs provides no substantial
motivation for one's efforts, and recognition of a devisable or de-
scendible publicity right would not significantly encourage creativ-
ity.57 The court discussed practical problems of judicial line-draw-
ing, including the difficulty of determining how long the right
would continue and to whom or what the right would apply.5 8 The
court also noted that other personal attributes with economic
value, such as titles, offices, and reputations, are not inheritable.59
Drawing an analogy between the interests protected by the law of
defamation and those protected by the right of publicity, the court
concluded that the right of publicity should similarly terminate at
death.60 The court indicated that a post-mortem right of publicity
would be "contrary to our legal tradition and . . . to the moral
suppositions of our culture"61 and that denial of such a post-
mortem right would be "fairer and more efficient.16 2 Thus, as a
result of the two Presley decisions, Factors and Memphis Develop-
ment, Factors has exclusive control over the Presley persona in
New York, but in Tennessee anyone may exploit the Presley fame
for profit.
In Lugosi v. Universal Picturess the California Supreme
54. The trial court had concluded that the right is inheritable both in its preliminary
injunction against Memphis Development Foundation, 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977)
(analyzing recent cases), and in its summary judgment for Factors, entered March 3, 1979
without an opinion.
55. The court did acknowledge the decisions supporting a right of inheritability in a
footnote. 616 F.2d at 958 n.2 (6th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 958-59.
57. Id. at 959.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 960.
63. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
1258 [Vol. 33:1251
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Court held that the right to exploit name and likeness is personal
to the artist and must be exercised, if at all, by him during his
lifetime.64 Lugosi was a suit by the heirs of actor Bela Lugosi, who
played the title role in the 1930 film Dracula, to recover profits
made by Universal in its licensing of the use of the Count Dracula
character6 5 to commercial firms and to enjoin Universal from mak-
ing additional grants without plaintiff's consent. The California
Supreme Court, adopting the opinion written by the Court of Ap-
peal,66 reversed the trial court's determination67 that the right of
publicity is inheritable. Although it acknowledged the new empha-
sis on the proprietary aspects of the right of publicity, the court
focused on principles applicable to the right of privacy, 8 discussed
several older cases that are clearly distinguishable, 9 and concluded
64. Id. at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329. See notes 71-72 infra and accom-
panying text.
65. The trial court found that Universal was licensing the uniquely individual likeness
and appearance of Bela Lugosi in the role of Count Dracula. 25 Cal. 3d at 817, 603 P.2d at
427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325. As one court pointed out, the issue in Lugosi is more complex
than in other right of publicity decisions in which actors portray themselves and develop
their own characters because Lugosi involves an established fictional character which has
been given a particular interpretation by Bela Lugosi. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400
F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
66. 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977).
67. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 35 (1977).
68. For example, while noting that the right to exploit one's name or likeness is assign-
able, 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327, and that the right of privacy
is personal, and hence not assignable, id. at 820, 603 P.2d at 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328, the
court treated the right to exploit one's name or likeness as embraced in the law of privacy
and therefore uninheritable. Id. at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
69. The court discussed Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965), James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344
P.2d 799 (1959), and Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954), final
amended complaint dism'd, 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327-38, 603
P.2d at 429-30. In Maritote defendant had produced a film about the late Al Capone. The
court held that Capone's widow and son could not recover for their pain and suffering
caused by invasion of the deceased Capone's privacy. The court declared the question of
unjust enrichment through appropriation of a property right to be irrelevant to the privacy
question and did not discuss its merits. In James plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to
compensation for defendant's motion picture exploitation of the personality of her deceased
husband, Jesse James, Jr., on the grounds of both emotional injury and pecuniary appropri-
ation. The court treated both actions as invasion of privacy claims and held that the right of
privacy is personal and not assertible by related third parties. The Schumann case, how-
ever, did address the right of publicity and its descent. Descendants of Robert Schumann,
who had been dead nearly a hundred years, contended that defendant's film depicting the
life of the composer constituted an appropriation of a descendible property right. The court
could find no support for a rule of descent when the ancestor had been dead for so many
years and when the descendants had not shown that they were Schumann's legal heirs.
Schumann is weak authority, however, in light of recent cases such as Price and Factors
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1251
that an inheritable publicity right would serve "neither society's
interest in the free dissemination of ideas nor the artist's rights to
the fruits of his own labor. . . . ",70 Although the decision expressly
holds that the right to exploit name and likeness can only be exer-
cised during the artist's lifetime,' 1 much of the opinion intimates
that the result would have been different had the artist exercised
his right.72
The dissent, in an exhaustive opinion,' 3 emphasized the differ-
ence between the right of privacy and the right of publicity and
discussed the principles elucidated in the Zacchini, Haelen, Price,
and Factors decisions. 4 The dissent concluded that the right of
publicity should be inheritable because it is proprietary in nature
and is similar to an inheritable copyright. 5
IV. ANALYSIS
Regardless of the formal classification of the right of publicity,
this right clearly protects pecuniary interests and is unconcerned
with personal and emotional interests. Unlike the right of privacy,
it is assignable,76 as our highly commercialized world dictates that
it must be. Consequently, in determining the scope of this recently
recognized but distinctly different right, courts must not apply
right of privacy principles simply because the right of publicity
evolved from the right of privacy.7 7
Both the Price"a and Factors7 9 decisions correctly ascertain
that the right of publicity is much more analogous to a property
holding that the right of publicity is inheritable in New York.
70. 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
71. "We hold that the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the artist and
must be exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime." Id.
72. The court intimated that assignment of the right is synonymous with its exercise
and that since Lugosi had not exercised his right through either assignment or direct ex-
ploitation, his name and likeness passed into the public domain upon his death. Id. The
court maintained that Lugosi in his lifetime had a right of value that could have been trans-
muted into things of value by his exercise of the right. Id. at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 326. For a further discussion of the possible interpretations of this opinion, see
Note, supra note 36, at 762-67.
73. 25 Cal. 3d at 828-59, 603 P.2d at 434-54, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 332-52 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 833-43, 603 P.2d at 437-44, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 335-42 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 844-49, 603 P.2d at 444-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 342-45 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
76. See notes 17, 34 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
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interest, be it tangible or intangible, than to the right of privacy.80
Because the right of publicity is similar to property in nature, the
courts' predilection was to make it inheritable like any other prop-
erty interest. The Price court could not discern any policy reasons
for terminating the right upon death81 and consequently held that
the right of publicity is inheritable. The Price decision, however, is
not analytically complete because of its failure to undertake a
thorough policy analysis. The Factors court, in contrast, properly
considered the various policy arguments regarding the
descendibility issue before finding an inheritable right. The court
first noted the right of a person and his estate to reap the reward
of his endeavors.2 It also emphasized the prevention of unjust en-
richment of outside parties who would receive a windfall in ex-
ploiting a hard-earned celebrity status without paying for the priv-
ilege.83 The Price decision held in effect that the right of publicity
is property and therefore descendible;8' the Factors court correctly
drew an analogy between the interests protected by rights of pub-
licity and property and, after considering policy arguments, con-
cluded that a publicity right, like a property right, should be
inheritable. 5
Although the Sixth Circuit correctly emphasized policy argu-
ments and did not rely upon right of privacy cases,8  Memphis De-
velopment87 makes an unpersuasive presentation of policy ratio-
nales for its denial of a post-mortem publicity right. The court
argued that the possibility of achieving celebrity status for the
benefit of one's heirs provides very little motivation for one's suc-
cess and that therefore the recognition of a post-mortem right of
publicity would not encourage effort or creativity.8 This argument,
however, could apply to any successful career that has commen-
surate financial rewards. The primary motivation for success in
any field is not to benefit one's heirs; yet any wealth that is accu-
mulated as a result of one's success does pass to one's heirs. Thus,
it seems more equitable for the celebrity's heirs, rather than
outside parties, to benefit from the celebrity's hard-earned success.
80. See notes 38-39, 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
83. Id. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 52-62 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
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The court also discussed problems of judicial line-drawing, 9 but
close inspection reveals that except for the issue of the duration of
the right, the problems are the same whether a person is alive or
deceased. The court's further argument that denial of a post-
mortem right would be fairer and more efficient9" is, in light of the
potential windfall to outsiders, similarly incorrect.
Although the right of publicity and defamation have some
similarities, the Sixth Circuit's analogy between the two is uncon-
vincing.91 Like the right of privacy, the action of defamation, which
protects against damage to reputation and corresponding loss of
earning capacity, is personal, nonassignable, and uninheritable 92
The right of publicity, on the other hand, is a transferable pecuni-
ary interest" and as such is more similar to a property interest
than to protection from defamation. Thus, although the Sixth Cir-
cuit identified the major arguments for denying the inheritability
of the right of publicity, these arguments fail to withstand critical
scrutiny.
The Lugosi9' court, by applying right of privacy principles"
and by relying on distinguishable right of privacy cases,96 ap-
proached the descendibility issue in a confused manner. Moreover,
the court's arguments9 7 that a post-mortem right of publicity
would serve neither society's interest in the free dissemination of
ideas nor the artist's right to the fruits of his own labor are ill-
founded.8 Society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas is
protected by first amendment guarantees," which protect the use
of another's name or likeness in the same manner whether that
person is alive or not. Furthermore, as the analysis of the Price
and Factors decisions indicates, the goal of allowing a person to
reap the benefit of his labors is best protected by making the right
of publicity inheritable. The Lugosi decision, however, probably
has little predictive value. Given the four-to-three divided court,
89. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
92. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 744-45.
93. See notes 17, 34 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 63-72 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 25 supra.
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the ambiguous holding,10 0 the unusual fact situation,10 1 and the
majority's adoption of the lower court's opinion,102 it is difficult to
predict what the California court would do with a case in which no
fictional characters were involved and the celebrity had clearly ex-
ploited his right of publicity while alive.
An integral aspect of the descendibility issue is the question
whether a person's exploitation of his right of publicity while alive
is a condition precedent to the inheritability of the right. Although
courts have not fully resolved this issue,l1s there appears to be no
reason to distinguish between those who have exploited their
names and likenesses and those who have not.104 The amount re-
covered for infringement of one's publicity right depends upon the
pecuniary interest affected, which in turn is commensurate with
the degree of celebrity status attained. Ordinarily, a person's pecu-
niary interest will be greater because he has exploited his name
and likeness, but there is no reason to deny recovery simply be-
cause a person has not sufficiently exploited his name. Such a de-
nial would be particularly unfair to a person who died shortly after
achieving fame and who had not had time to exploit his celebrity
status. In that situation, the prevention of unjust enrichment 0 5
would seem to be an overriding policy objective. Therefore, courts
should not require prior exploitation as a precondition to inherita-
bility of the right of publicity, but should consider prior exploita-
tion in determining the magnitude of the pecuniary interest af-
fected and hence the recovery allowed.
Another important collateral issue to the question of inherita-
bility is whether a post-mortem publicity right should be limited to
a designated period. Several courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have recognized the similarity of copyright law to
the right of publicity.0 6 Consequently, as some have proposed,10 7
100. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 65 supra.
102. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 50, 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
104. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 848, 603 P.2d 425, 447, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 345 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Note, supra note 36, at 765. But see Felcher &
Rubin, supra note 25, at 1618-19.
105. See notes 49, 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 29, 47-48, 75 supra and accompanying text.
107. 25 Cal. 3d at 844-49, 603 P.2d at 444-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 342-45 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). In response to the Memphis Development decision, Felcher and Rubin ex-
panded on their article cited in note 25 supra and argued that the right of publicity is most
closely analogous to copyright law and hence should be inheritable. Felcher & Rubin, The
Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE
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the fifty year post-mortem limitation of copyright law or a similar
cut-off period could be adopted for the right of publicity. Such a
limitation would preserve valuable publicity rights for a celebrity's
immediate heirs and yet permit a celebrity's name and likeness to
pass to the public domain a certain period after his death.
V. CONCLUSION
In a highly commercialized society in which a person's name
and likeness can be very valuable, it is imperative that courts ex-
amine the right of publicity with reference to the pecuniary inter-
est protected and weigh various policy objectives in determining
whether this right should be inheritable. Although problems such
as that of the post-mortem duration of the publicity right remain
to be resolved, the reasons for allowing inheritability of the right
outweigh the reasons against it. Both the similarity of the right of
publicity to a property interest and the notion that a celebrity's
heirs rather than unrelated third parties should benefit from that
celebrity's hard-earned success compel the conclusion that the
right of publicity should be inheritable. The Factors decision, ana-
lytically sound and persuasive, provides proper guidance for the
courts of other states. At present, however, while our society's com-
mercial communications are frequently interstate, the publicity
rights of deceased celebrities' heirs are far from uniform.
BEN C. ADAMs
L.J. 1125 (1980).
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